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INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, it is not uncommon to observe how, as far as responsibility and responsible practises 
are concerned, a key determinant is often taken for granted or overlooked: we are referring to the 
essential requirement that existent “applied” responsible actions in the business/economic sphere - 
for example, if we think of business organisational contexts: CSR projects, actions, practises and 
policies - can only exist through the creation of “collective actions”, i.e. activities that require more 
than one person for their planning, strategical/operational implementation and reconstitution. The 
majority of existent initiatives or “applied ethics” fields of research can fall within this description: 
professional and business ethics activities - encompassing technology, computing, medical, engi-
neering, media, financial issues, ranging from the public interest, the nature of integrity, privacy and 
confidentiality, intellectual property to whistleblowing and trust. 
At the same time, the contemporary mainstream CSR critical discourse (for example Abbarno, 
2001; Fooks, Gilmore, Collin, Holden, Lee, 2013; Newell, 2005) - sees “responsible” processes, 
practises and policies as usually (and mainly) aiming at finding ways to help boards better serve 
shareholders’ interests: this can explain why public opinion is still under the impression that social 
responsibility rarely goes beyond self-serving and self-congratulatory marketing efforts (e.g. Mora-
tis & Cochius, 2011) or strategic calculations of how investing in CSR can enhance/protect corpora-
te reputation and financial performance (e.g. McWilliams and Siegel 2000). In this context, it is not 
surprising that - despite the importance acquired in the last 20 years by CSR and responsibility-rela-
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ted issues - an increasing number of organizations has been caught acting irresponsibly (Gallino, 
2005; Jones, Boyd, Tench, 2009; Tench, Sun, Jones 2012). It is also often understood that difficul-
ties in effective implementation of responsible actions, especially in developing countries (see for 
example Abugre 2014), mainly stem from leadership weak spots (often correlated to mismanage-
ment and corruption), lack of commitment and unwillingness to allocate resources. 
In other words, if it is true that ethical leadership is best understood in the context of virtues 
practised in plural communities (see Robinson 2011), it is equally clear that organisational respon-
sibility implies an ethical and plural accountability, and its success is strictly connected with thema-
tic areas like shared agency, collective intentionality, collective responsibility - each of which pre-
sents specific challenges. 
GOOD OLD-FASHIONED RECURRING DICHOTOMIES? 
Traditionally, Western ethical theories and legal codes are based on an idea of “individual re-
sponsibility” where individuals deliberate, morally evaluate and then decide: this view informs 
many contemporary CSR practises. On the other side, a “relational turn” - able to place in strong 
question this monolithic idea of an isolated (and probably alienated) independently responsible in-
dividual (see for example McNamee & Gergen 1999) - can serve as a basis for opening new options 
for co-constructing responsibility as a relational, circular, reflexive movement, something closer to 
social capital and relational goods (Prandini 2011, 2014) 
Therefore, it is not useless to remember the “classic” contrast between methodological indivi-
dualism and methodological holism (as introduced by Watkins 1952), even though to put it in terms 
of a black-and-white dualism may appear tendentious (since there are only a few social scientist that 
would define themselves as out-and-out individualist or holist). Indeed, there are many individuali-
sm/holism sub-debates in ethics, social sciences, anthropology, philosophy of language, social onto-
logy, etc. (Zahle, 2016), and there are good reasons to believe that the ongoing debate about the na-
ture of responsibility should translate and import these crucial issues on its own terms. 
More specifically, we are under the impression that within the current CSR prevailing literature, 
the individualist argument has more or less obliquely prevailed along with the neo-liberalist ideolo-
gy: as a matter of fact, the economic imaginary conflates multiple corporate prerogatives into the 
ownership of shares or executives’ agency (Veldman & Willmott, 2013, p. 616). 
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Hence, it is not surprising to notice - as Seabright and Kurke did (Seabright & Kurke, 1997, pp. 
102) - that more than sixty years ago an interdisciplinary scholar like Kenneth Boulding pointed out
how “it is not easy to separate clearly the level of the human organism from the next level, that of
social organisations” (Boulding, 1956, p. 205). In this regard - e.g. speaking of the “ontological”
status of corporations - arguments on both sides have been developed or presented: following Sea-
bright & Kurke (1997, p. 91), we can then identify two broad positions (as explained in Donaldson,
1982). On the one hand, those maintaining a moral status to corporations claim that organisational
processes and procedures make it possible for corporations to perform intentional acts that are
ascribable to the corporation as a whole (see for example French, 1979, 1984); on the other hand,
those against assigning moral status to corporations argue that institutionalised, artificial, formal
organisations are like machines (i.e. incapable of acting on the basis of moral obligations) and only
biological, “tangible” persons have to be considered intentional agents capable of forming goals
and act accordingly (see for example Ladd, 1970 and Velasquez, 1983). This would mean that - sin-
ce corporate actions are not “reducible to” but are indeed basically “dependent on” individual ac-
tions - collectives are moral agents only in a secondary sense (Werhane, 1985).
Generally speaking, there are a number of different versions of this same simplifying dichotomic 
approach that places social collectives on the one side, and individual members on the other: one of 
the most well-known ones is expressed in the puzzle of the ship of Theseus (presented in Nozick 
1981), where the question of “group identity” over time can be addressed either by claiming that, 
holding configuration constant, the components of a group determine its identity or by maintaining 
that the structural spatiotemporal continuity of a complex object determines its identity, regardless 
of the replacement of its constituents.  
A similar dualism is reflected in organisational theory (see Katz & Kahn, 1978), where a tension 
is there between a phenomenologist approach - maintaining an individualist view that organisations 
do not have a separate and autonomous ontological (and moral) status - and a structuralist approach 
positing that organisations (as enduring and quite stable “patterns of behaviour”) imply a level of 
analysis that transcends individuals. 
If - Aristotelianly speaking - we consider excess and defect as characteristic of vice, and the 
mean as typical of virtue, we cannot but recall the well-known Margaret Archer’s theoretical posi-
tion (see Archer 2000), where the “excessive” options within the structure/agency debate are formu-
lated in terms of downward conflation (“society”/structure dominates people/agents: Durkheim is 
often cited as an iconic example), upward conflation (people are the “orchestrators”/architects of 
society: Weber’s vision is emblematic of this approach), and central conflation - the latter blends 
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structure and agency into unspecified movements of co-constitution, precluding any sociological 
observation/explanation of their relative influence (Giddens’ structurationism is typically mentio-
ned: a criticism of this argument can be found in Piironen, 2014). 
As suggested by Magatti (1999), this dualistic debate is only one aspect of a far wider subject 
matter, i.e. the relationship between organisation and its surrounding context, which permeates any 
organisation from the inside, through firm’s constitutive elements (groups and individuals). 
An individualist argument, for example, can be refuted because, if rational choice theory beco-
mes prevalent, then responsibility can be mainly seen as something (at the very most) subsidised or 
incentivized on an economic basis (Coleman 1985) - since a strategic neo-liberalist approach would 
be structurally unable to include and compute other aspects of human life. As a consequence, insti-
tutions may fruitfully work as unburdening devices (see Gehlen 1980) preventing individuals from 
having to decide each time anew, and the exercise of responsibility would be considered to be either 
too heavy a load or a superfluous activity: after all, for those at the bottom of the pyramid, it is 
more and more impossible to detect those who are liable or imputable, while in turn, for those at the 
top of the pyramid, it is more and more difficult to take decisions based on a more and more incom-
plete and ambiguous information. The transformation and inclusion of corporations into increasin-
gly global and complex (less and less accountable) supply chain processes dissolves responsibility 
into a labyrinth, so that ultimately no one is responsible (again, “imputability” remains a problem, 
see Robinson, 2009; Ricoeur 1994), and we resign ourselves to the absence of responsibility (or to 
the presence of irresponsibility, see Tench, Sun, Jones, 2012) in a context a structural disorder. The-
se processes lead to a progressive “habituation”/passive adaptation to dysfunctional institutions, 
leading to opportunism and annihilation of personality (Gehlen 1980, p. 51). A more managerial and 
institutionalist stance could see responsibility as an integral part of economic strategy (see for 
example Ackerman & Bauer 1976): since there is no such thing as an “isolate subject”, then the or-
ganisation and its environment are deliberately interconnected, integrated and, consequently, coe-
volving. Hence, in the light of these limitations, “to integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” - this 
is CSR according to 2001 Green Paper - may seem an unsustainable challenge, or something ap-
proachable only by a small number of big “technocratic” players. Put in this terms, responsibility 
seems to be a paradoxical process of exclusion generated by an inclusive systemic logic, a source of 
both major systemic failures and local organisational problems.  
In other words, does the future of responsibility lie in an economy artificially arranged by imper-
sonal and imposing institutions armed with big data managed by highly schooled experts at the 
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World Bank, IMF or other globalized dominant institutions? Surely, we are increasingly surrounded 
by institutions replicating their values, (i.e. a taken-for-granted version of technological, economic 
and human progress), and the system of science (with its peculiar methods, practises and self-eva-
luation protocols) - while it appears to be both open/inclusive and specialistic/exclusive - is at risk 
of becoming a closed and indifferent techno-science, functional for the domain of institutional ap-
paratuses, with no room for the exercise of responsibility. 
This is a possible reason why an institutional approach to responsibility should not cannibalize 
the role of those constitutive elements (groups and individuals) which act within any organisational 
context. After all, the “modern” idea of replacing character (and performed acts) with “externally 
verifiable facts” (to whom rules and algorithms can be applied) is the foundation of the depersonali-
sation of managerial ethical thinking. Its main presupposition is that man is a “species” regulated by 
“laws”, in which case individual action is only the single occurrence of a general function, and (sin-
ce true “decisions” would no longer be required) responsibility simply becomes a matter of rule-fol-
lowing. Institutional actions are then “rationally oriented” towards the achievement of aims, ends, 
objectives or needs, and per se tend to exclude any “external” perspective inclusive of the relation-
ship between the agents and the tasks to be performed: this is why, as Bauman (1989) argues, insti-
tutions can be tools that erase responsibility, or can similarly lead to states of “externalised hetero-
nomy” that preclude any internalisation of values (Riesman 1950)  
At the same time, ethical or responsibility-related problems are not merely and banally reducible 
to inter-personal problems in the workplace: rather - since the existence of causal powers is a condi-
tion of existence for responsibility (both individual and collective) - how should we re-embed social 
and environmental concerns into a increasingly “depersonalised” economic/financial agency? 
FOUNDATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITY AND SOCIAL ONTOLOGY: 
SHARED AGENCY, COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY,  
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY  
How can behaviours and actions “interlock” and - more or less effectively - produce articulated 
“emergent processes of cooperation and cohesiveness”? 
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A consensus has arisen about the importance of structuring processes and implementation dyna-
mics for the success of responsible practices, at different level of analysis (see Robinson 2011, p. 
268): micro-level (where responsible leaders can act as role models in their work with individuals 
and teams); meso-level (where contribution to organizational discussions and policy development is 
at stake); macro-level (where professional bodies engage politically and ensure their voice is heard 
at national and international/global forums). 
As a consequence, in business ethics-focused research multiple level of analysis (and their mu-
tual interrelations) have to be taken into account: Member of the Board of Directors; CEOs; Mem-
ber of CSR working group; CSR Managers/Coordinators; employees that have the information nee-
ded and/or have a strong opinion about CSR organisational performance; employees that do not 
have the information needed and/or do not have a strong opinion about CSR organisational perfor-
mance; external stakeholders. 
Therefore, an interest about how groups are articulated and how “responsible” processes, projec-
ts, policies and strategies are jointly negotiated and relationally carried out - in a cooperative and 
constructive way - remains crucial. The latter core issues can be defined in terms of social ontology: 
a new alliance between empirical research and metaphysical and ontological enquiry about the rela-
tional/societal aspects within organisational - and within their responsibility-related political, envi-
ronmental, social, techno-environmental, legal, ethical dimensions (see Morandi, 2006) - is desira-
ble, now more than ever.  
From a sociological realist point of view (as analysed in Arrigoni 2018), the way “responsibility” 
is implemented within any given organisation/corporation is “a form of knowledge through which 
the members […] produce a self-representation of themselves as whole” (Morandi 2017, p. 28). As 
we can state about any possible social process and context, each shared representation (e.g. a com-
pany code of ethics, or a CSR report) diffuses a self-interpretation capable of influencing social 
practises. This is particularly intriguing if we remember that organisational contexts and practises 
are neither empirically nor cognitively accessible outside of their (symbolic) representations; no 
member can perceptually experience its partaken organisation “as a whole”: nonetheless, we can 
observe that - in each specific empirical relation or responsible practise - there exist a social/organi-
zational dimension, mediated by symbolic representations.  
Therefore, a duality (a complementarity?) is there, between: 1) a kind of research that tries to 
attain CSR objective dimension and attempts to focus on its structural coordinates; 2) a different 
kind of research that takes subjective dimensions into account, and seeks to point out how - together 
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with the objectivity of social phenomena - psychic (social psychology) and anthropological elemen-
ts concur (Morandi 2017, p. 26). 
As for the social realm, then, social ontology can be meant to be concerned with investigating 
the manner in which social phenomena depend necessarily on human interactions, and therefore can 
also be concerned with the nature of such existents as social relations, corporations, communities, 
power, authorities, trust, cooperation, institutions, norms, rules, custom, convention, collective prac-
tice. As a consequence, what kind of moral and ontological meaning is implied in shared agency, 
collective intentionality and collective responsibility, all of which are necessary dynamics for re-
sponsibility to be effective and real? Are we dealing with emergent social entities or just with insti-
tutional facts (see for example Lawson, 2016)? 
We have very good reasons to believe that the inclusion of social ontology into the vexing di-
lemma about delineating the boundary between individual (ethical) and collective (organisational) 
responsibility can surely enrich this longstanding debate. As abstract as it may sound, the operatio-
nal implementation and reconstitution of responsible practices has a lot to do, when economic pro-
cesses are at stake, with the ontological and symbolical analysis and representation of the dynamic 
corporation form.  
If we think of the firm as an emergent reality, as a cohesive irreducible whole made of human 
and non-human components which is (and needs to be) dynamically reconstituted (as for example 
suggested in Chassagnon, 2014, p. 199, but also in Demaria, 1982 from a totally different “meta-
physical” point of view), all of the above prominent areas of activity maintain a cohesive continuity, 
and responsible policies and behaviours endure through specific “articulated” dynamics. The notion 
of “articulation” (whose metaphysical-sociological implications have been defined and analysed in 
Morandi, 2017, while the notion itself was introduced by Eric Voegelin, 1987) essentially and pri-
marily denotes an emergent property of empirical relations: “this process in which human beings 
form themselves into a society for action [can] be called the articulation of a society” (Voegelin, 
1987, p. 37). The latter notion can entail a possible ramification towards political science - which 
however remains relevant for CSR studies - but, even more importantly, we underline that “articula-
tion” denotes an actualisation, something that brings into being ability and possibility of a common-
action, i.e. a community. Chassagnon (2014, p.199) describes this possibility in terms of “emergent 
processes of cooperation and cohesiveness”: more specifically, organisation of responsibility (and 
responsible organisations) are based on an ability to act for a common goal and on the cohesiveness 
that is created to achieve this goal. 
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As anticipated above, a possible way of implementing these important subjects of inquiry in or-
der to bridge some existing gaps in CSR/Business Ethics studies - is to start focusing on three inter-
related and adjoining notions: shared agency, collective intentionality and collective responsibility.  
Shared agency 
There is no doubt that all of the above complex strategic areas can be adequately addressed only 
if responsible organisational actions are the effective product of a unified exercise of agency, whose 
realisation or delusion “can be of interest for a variety of disciplines, including politics, social 
science, economics, ethics, law, (social) epistemology and organisational psychology” (Roth, 2016, 
p.1). If we want to explore the implication of “acting together” for relevant empirical research and
its results, we have to ask ourselves if “shared agency” could be understood under the theoretical
frameworks available to us from the study of individual agency. For example, a way of trying and
distinguishing individuals’ actions that together constitute shared activity from those that form a
mere aggregation of individual acts can be a matter of intention, more precisely of “we-
intentions” (see Tuomela & Miller, 1985, for a first elaboration of this notion), i.e. of attitudes had
by whatever entity is denoted (or can be denoted) by a “we”. From this point of view, while it is not
obvious that, as a constituent of a supra-individual entity (e.g. as an employee working for a multi-
national corporation), I am necessarily committed to what the corporation is up to, nonetheless there
is a sense in which I am committed to what we are doing (basically, my job/our jobs).
A pivotal notion about the nature of shared agency is the concept of “participatory intention”, 
which accounts for each individual’s participatory commitment to a collective activity: Tuomela 
and Miller (1988) defend a reductionist approach that understands we-intentions in term of indivi-
dual intentions, such that I can have a participatory intention in a project if I intend to do my part in 
it, if I feel that the project makes sense and can be successful and if I think that a similar belief is 
mutually held and shared by the other members of the group; on the other hand Searle (1990) con-
tends that such a reductive approach does not per se entail the essential cooperation, co-extensive-
ness and agreement, without which no genuine shared activity is possible. Bratman (1992) main-
tains a halfway position definable in terms of practical intersubjectivity, where individual intentions 
taking the form “I intend that we do this” are the basic components (thus apparently positioning 
closer to a reductionist approach), but where also meshing of sub-plans (and intentions to mesh sub-
plans) are equally necessary. How participatory intentions are implemented and negotiated in each 
and every organisational context is a very meaningful point of observation for responsible practises.  
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Roth (2016, pp. 16-18) also outlines an additional element supporting the idea that some group 
can be really subjects of shared agency, displaying group intentional attitude: for example, List and 
Pettit (2002) - as they examine judgment aggregation and its properties - show that significant va-
riations emerge between group decisions taken on the basis of “majority votes” on each individual 
member’s global preferences and group decisions made adopting a premise-driven procedure where 
group’s views regarding each premise (i.e. decision component) are considered. These divergent 
outcomes can suggest that groups or organisations may be considered genuine intentional subjects, 
and this claim can be relevant for the development of empirical research as well. 
Collective Responsibility  
Does collective responsibility have to do with moral blameworthiness? Or does it have to do 
with merely causal connections between intentions - conceived as internal “mental states” - and ac-
tions/outcomes - in the form of “ostensible effects” in the external world? Is group morality ascri-
bed to discrete individuals and/or morally located in the individual moral free will? Or is the source 
of moral responsibility attributed to groups - and the actions considered are collective actions taken 
by groups qua collectives?  
Smiley (2011) explains that the very possibility and coherence of “collective responsibility” as 
an intellectual construct has been challenged by methodological or normative individualists (see 
again Watkins, 1952): at the core of individualist argument, there is a generalised scepticism about 
the existence of genuinely collective actions because firstly, unlike individuals, groups cannot form 
intentions (and therefore cannot be understood to act as a group) and, secondly, because groups 
cannot be kept responsible as morally blameworthy in a strong sense, since this could violate the 
ethical and legal principles of both individual responsibility and fairness (as suggested for example 
in Sverdlik, 1987). It is not difficult to see how the classical Max Weber’s claim (Weber, 1922, p. 
15) is echoed here: namely, that social phenomena must be explained by referring to individual ac-
tions, which in turn must be analysed by addressing the intentional states motivating the individual
actors.
Recently, as Smiley (2011) analyses in detail, a new attention has been given to the advantages 
and disadvantages of holding particular kinds of groups morally responsible in practice, and the 
main coordinates of this debate can also be interestingly drawn into CSR studies, both from a theo-
retical and practical point of view. Overall, the main underlying issues can be summarized as follo-
ws: a) whether or not collective responsibility makes morally sense, making it possible for groups 
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to be distinctively blameworthy or guilty; b) how can collective responsibility be distributed across 
individual members; c) how collectively ascribed responsibility potentially clash with social justice, 
and how collective responsibility can be operationally productive and fair. 
In brief, we can observe how contemporary critics of collective responsibility rely on two as-
sumptions: a) that actions - as distinguishable from mere behaviours - are based on intentions; b) in 
order to be held responsible of anything, a specific “bad intention” is required. Since collectives do 
not have “mental lives” or hold beliefs in an intentional way, a number of authors - including for 
example Lewis (1948) or more recently Narveson (2002) - can try and demonstrate that actions and 
moral agency can be exclusively associated with individuals. 
On the other hand, defenders of collective responsibility rely on multiple philosophical and prac-
tical arguments to justify the possibility of collective responsibility. Among the many theoretical 
streams that could be potentially included and mentioned, we can outline the following:  
a) very simply, “blaming attitudes are held towards collective as well as individuals” (Cooper,
1968, p. 258), and quite often we refer our emotional states - like indignation, resentment, ap-
proval - to groups, or we can experience something similar - shame or pride, for instance - as
group members (see Tollefsen, 2006);
b) even though not all kind of groups are necessarily capable of acting and behaving collectively
- since for example the aforementioned “emergent processes of cooperation and
cohesiveness” (Chassagnon, 2014, p.199) are not always there (see the difference between ag-
gregate and conglomerate collectives, French, 1984, p. 5) - some practical criteria used for di-
stinguishing where collective responsibility is ascribable have been listed (ibidem):
(1) some group actions have an identifiable moral agent (e.g. a representative body, a board,
etc.), and a set of self-consciously decision are made on a rational and shared basis; this
happens particularly where courses of actions can be chosen by consolidated organisational
mechanisms, such as standard of conduct enabling to identify group discipline, group ethos
and a configuration of defined roles by which organisational powers are exercised;
(2) paradigmatically, collective responsibility can be ascribed where group members share
common needs or take strong interest in in each other’s interests, since they are more likely
to jointly pursue projects and solidarity dynamics (e.g. strong identification, proud exhibi-
tion of collective consciousness, etc.)
(3) shared attitudes can make the group itself eligible for collective responsibility;
a) collective intentionality may be the key to understand when and whether group meet the same
conditions of moral responsibility that individuals do, as if a sort of truly plural subject could be
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considered when more subjects combine in such a way as to make one subject: in this respect, 
while group intentions can barely or very unlikely sustained by the notion of “collective 
mind” (Sosa, 2009), the concepts of plural “joint commitments” (Gilbert, 2000; Bratman 1993, 
2006) or - even more, as seen above - of “we-intentions” (Tuomela, 2005, 2006) that supervene 
on individual intentional agency allow us to talk about how collective group-based intentions, 
belief, desires, projects can be taken into account. 
Collective intentionality 
If we think at responsible practises, projects and actions as instances of “joint actions” carried 
out by group agents such as business enterprises, the notion of “collective intentionality” is absolu-
tely central. Collective intentional attitudes are like relevant indexes that play a decisive role in the 
constitution of social actions, and are of great interest for philosophers of actions, cultural anthropo-
logists, social scientists: similarly, they could be of great interest for those streams of research ai-
ming at understanding how, why and to what extent participants into responsible actions need to 
have at least a vague general idea of the enterprise as a whole, and a more structured idea of their 
allotted part in it (see Collingwood’s definition of “society” in Collingwood, 1947, p. 146). Gene-
rally speaking, a special attention needs to be placed to the specific modes in which this collective 
intentionality is constituted, and namely: collective acceptance as a precondition for the creation 
and sharing of a common institutional language; shared intentions as a way of coordinating their 
actions in a cooperative way; joint attention, as it makes it possible to experience a given organisa-
tional reality as an available common ground for multiple agents. How to translate all these “modes 
of collective intentionality” into measurable or at least investigable indexes for empirical research? 
This surely represents a future challenge for CSR studies.  
Nonetheless, a “central problem” about collective intentionality - put forward in terms of a cru-
cial contradiction by Schweikard and Schmid (2013) - lies in the difficult composition of the two 
following usually accepted statements. The first is the so-called Irreducibility Claim, affirming that 
collective intentionality is not reducible to a mere summation, aggregation or distributive pattern of 
individual intentionalities. This position maintains a substantial difference between aggregates/
summations of individual intentions (even if combined with common knowledge and shared be-
liefs) and genuine collective intentions, which on the one hand are collectively and not distributively 
ascribable, but on the other hand do not displace participating individuals as the bearers of indivi-
dual intentions: in spite of that, this idea clashes with the second viewpoint that intentional status of 
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individuals are really their own. The second statement at stake is instead the so-called Individual 
Ownership Claim, according to which collective intentionality is owned by individuals, and then 
any intentionality an individual displays is his/her own only because each individual displays a sort 
of intentional autonomy: this position conflicts with the idea that individual minds are by some 
means fused when collective intentionality are at issue. 
This apparently unsolvable contradiction seems to bring us back to the aforementioned dichoto-
my between individualist and collectivist stances. A possibility to escape this dualistic impasse lies 
in the possibility of recalling the dialectic interplay between structure and agency in terms of an 
analytical dualism, as proposed by Margaret Archer (see for example, 2000). While recognizing 
that structure and agency are interdependent (i.e. without people there would be no “structures”, and 
therefore no responsible practices/projects/protocols/strategies), Archer argues that it is possible to 
draw a distinction between them analytically, since the two operate on different timescales: this 
means that antecedently existing structures “constrain” and “enable” agents, whose actions and in-
teractions can lead to structural elaboration and potential reproduction or transformation of the ini-
tial structure. The resulting structure then provides a similar context of action for future agents, in 
the same way as the initial antecedently existing structure was itself the outcome of structural elabo-
ration resulting from the action of prior agents: more specifically, Archer talks about a “morphoge-
netic sequence in which structure condition agency and agency, in turn, elaborates upon the structu-
re which it confronts” (Archer, 2000, p. 306).  
We must here recall the “conditions of responsibility” as outlined by Hans Jonas in his classical 
The Imperative of Responsibility: “The first and most general condition of responsibility is causal 
power, that is, that acting makes an impact on the world; the second, that such acting is under the 
agent’s control; and the third, that he can foresee its consequences to some extent.” (Jonas 1984, p. 
90). However, what do we mean by the term “causal power”, and by the connected notion of “for-
mal causation”?  
The notion of formal causation (Lawson, 2016, p. 363; 2015, p. 3) can be fruitfully employed in 
this context, to denote those arrangements/organisations of the parts that enable organisational 
emergent powers and efficient causation. Basically, any emergent totality, qua an organised entity, 
is irreducible to the mere aggregation of its components, precisely because the way the components 
are arranged or relationally organised endows the totality with some causal emergent powers which 
are not predictable from those of the elements when considered apart of their eventual mutual posi-
tioning within the totality. We can imagine some bricks when arranged randomly or when making 
up a house, or the articulated social positioning and the relevant collective practises in a community. 
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When CSR projects are on the table, for example, the roles of such formal causation (i.e. organisa-
tional arrangements) provides us with a criterion that makes us able to assess whether and how real 
organisational causal powers can be evaluated, explored, implemented, optimized, adopted. 
Morandi (2011) goes further and intelligently suggests to go back over Aristotle and his traditio-
nal theory of the four causes (namely: material, efficient, formal, final), and to show its appropria-
teness for sociological issues, and for CSR empirical analysis more specifically. Namely, formal 
and final causality are linked to the dialectic morphogenetic/morphostatic dynamics between struc-
ture and agency: while “form” is an ordering principle that makes the totality of parts different from 
the simple sum of the parts, the passage (i.e. organisational change) from one form to another im-
plies the introduction of a “new order” between the parts composing the whole - an order that will 
give rise to a new stability/unity between them. Then, structural causal (formal) powers initially 
originate from the aims intentionally shared by their creators: however, and thereafter, the formal 
causality of structures becomes a property that no longer belongs to their co-creators, but belongs to 
the order elaborated by them. Conversely, aims are the completion the processes tend to, i.e. the 
attainment of a new stability/form - of the elements composing the whole. Agents have finalistic 
causal powers, and aims - since they are desired - do not only give rise to structures, but underlie 
the capacity to move from existing social forms/structures. Once conceived, aims do not yet have a 
social valence/causal powers, but they acquire them once they become the driving force of agency: 
in other words, they become capable of exerting causal power only if they can translate themselves 
into an action that has a structural causal influence (i.e. is capable of changing or stabilizing exi-
sting structures). 
A slightly different (but equally important) contribution coming from a critical realist perspective 
is Tony Lawson’s view about social emergence, that we briefly recall in this context because is con-
vergent with our argument that CSR studies should embrace a social ontology-focused perspective. 
According to his view (see for example Lawson, 2015), morphogenesis denotes those process whe-
re the social emergence of novel totalities occurs: community is the most general or common form 
of such totalities, and firms (and their component groups) are fundamentally communities with spe-
cific emergent organising structures (and relevant processes, cfr. Demaria’s account of dynamic 
transcendentals below).  
Similarly, we can notice that the term “community” - when not properly elaborated - can lead to 
vague descriptions of it, as an “organisational form” identifiable by some kind of geographical, 
technological, functional delimiting factor: on the contrary, we think that a morphogenetic approach 
- isolating structural and/or cultural factors which provide a context of action for agents - makes it
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possible to investigate how those elements shape the subsequent interactions of agents and how tho-
se interactions in turn reproduce or transform the initial context. 
FINAL REMARKS ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY:  
FROM THE “SUPPOSITION” TO THE “CONSTRUCTION” OF SOCIETY 
Tiziana Andina (2016) has recently reformulated the state of play in terms of a distinction bet-
ween P-ontologies, I-ontologies, and O-ontologies, which are seen as different starting points on the 
basis of which to develop an explanation of social reality. P-ontologies focus on the concept of Per-
son (or agent) as well as on the relationships between people, and can be traced back to an Aristote-
lian approach to the problem: a paradigmatic representative of this position is for example Margaret 
Gilbert, according to which group intentions exist when more persons constitute the plural subject 
of an intention, or when they are jointly committed to intending as a body to do something (see for 
example Gilbert, 2000). On the other side, I-ontologies regard Institutions, rules and language as the 
center of social reality: for instance this position is exemplified by the position of John Searle, who-
se conception puts “institutional facts” rather than emergent social entities at the center of social 
ontology (see Lawson, 2016; Searle 1995, 2006). The third group - O-ontologies - concentrates on 
the role and function of social objects, such as documents (see for example Ferraris 2007). 
We cannot help but recalling Ricoeur’s definition of ethics as “a good life, with and for others, 
within just institutions” (Ricoeur, 1992), according to which human beings certainly share practical 
reason and practical humanity, but “just institutions” are those which allow their full expression. 
That adjective - “just” - posits a huge difference with all the “institutional” disabling, paradoxical 
and counter-productive perspectives analysed above: actually, we may argue (with and beyond Illi-
ch) that in institutionalised contexts responsibility does not disappear, but re-emerges in different 
ways.  
To sum up, then, all the aforementioned issues converge on a final question: can this kind of de-
bate be meaningful both for advancing the current theories/models and/or remedying failures in 
practice? Lawson (2015, p. 8) raises a similar question when he states that - provided that firms are 
a form a community - it is important to understand what forms they take and what processes consti-
tute a community into a firm type (or a group, or a strategic panel, or a steering committee, or any-
thing similar). Is it sufficient that the members declare themselves to be and/or constitute such a 
whole/a unity/a group/an organisation? What are the underlying positioning/structuring strategies 
and processes?  
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At the same time, a certain dynamic tension between organisational ethical values and personal 
qualities remains when ethical leadership and CSR programmes are at issue: for example, as far as 
an ethical framework for public sector is concerned (see EUPAN, 2004), some core ethical leader-
ship organisational values are invoked: the Principle of the rule of law, Impartiality/Objectivity, Re-
liability/Confidence/Trust, Transparency/Openness, Duty of care, Courtesy/Willingness to help in a 
respectful manner (‘service principle’), Professionalism/Expertise, Accountability.  
These organisational values are in turn understood to generate some kind of organisational stan-
dards of conduct, which act as a cultural model for collective ethos. The aforementioned EUPAN 
ethical framework, for example, lists the following: Handling of confidential information, Accep-
tance of gifts or favours, Regulations on outside activity (e.g. reporting second jobs or asking for 
permission), Regulations on financial interests (e.g. declaration of financial interests), Post-em-
ployment restrictions, Use of public resources (e.g. phone, internet, email), Avoiding conflict of in-
terest in purchasing and contracting (e.g. procurement rules, separation of responsibilities), Tende-
ring regulations on purchases.  
Then, specific policies for the implementation, promotion and stimulation of these values and 
standard of conduct become necessary: namely, Recruitment, Training, Mobility, Communication 
and Leadership must take into account such values and standard. All this means that, somehow, af-
ter structuring ethical leadership as a part of group morality (values and standards of conduct), an 
enduring and continuous effort to implement collective responsibility is required. 
Tommaso Demaria (1982) has tried and identified, from a theoretical and metaphysical point of 
view, a solution to this problem (probably without being sufficiently aware that… true problems do 
not have a “solution” but a history!): here-actualised a classical philosophical topos, i.e. the doctrine 
of transcendentals (i.e those properties co-extensive with being). Basically, Demaria identified 
some dynamic transcendentals (i.e. properties of a company/organisation as a being or, in other 
words, as a “dynamic entity constantly under construction”), as qualities that pertain to any group/
totality/collectives: if a collective lacks such qualities, it is not really “articulated” and is only an 
ersatz unity, with no real formal/causal emergent powers (bound to fail as a responsible player). 
Properly elaborated, these transcendentals can be considered as indexes that will help outlining tho-
se structuring intra- and inter-enterprise processes which lead to the best results (in terms of social 
capital and relational goods growth) for the actors involved (individuals, families, firms, business 
networks, economic districts).  
The basic dynamic transcendentals are: 
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- educativity/educationality: whether and to what extent members are prepared and educated to
act according to responsibility-oriented practises;
- morality: whether and to what extent intra- and inter-enterprise procedures, rules and aspects
ease and encourage socially responsible practises;
- sociality: whether and to what extent a responsibility-oriented culture can ease, encourage
and enhance the cohabitation/coexistence of the different actors involved;
- missionarity: whether and to what extent responsibility-oriented practises impact, spread out
and propagate in the different settings
This framework is not an all-encompassing solution, but gives some important pointers about 
how the notion of “responsibility” can be reappraised within a social ontology-focused context: this 
is like saying that the existence of a organised social reality must neither be taken for granted, nor 
presupposed as the domain/origin of responsibility, since responsibility - instead of assuming the 
existence of society - is a way to build it. From this of way, relational and organisational virtues 
constitute the practice of resistance to systemic disintegration: it is not surprising then Lawson ar-
gues that the relations of rights and obligations that underly all social “organisational forms” rest on 
the “the exercise of human capacities of trusting and being trustworthy, so that trust and trustwor-
thiness are necessarily all pervasive and basic” (2015, p.7). 
If we accept that responsibility requires any action to be under the individual/collective agent’s 
control, and to enact and implement a degree of causal power, we must remember - together with 
Hannah Arendt (definitely, an overshadowed voice in the debate about responsibility, see the classi-
cal 1958) - that action would not be possible without two fundamental human faculties: promising 
and forgiveness. The former undoes the hold of the future on the present by pacifying its unpredic-
tability, while the latter loosens the grip of the past by alleviating its irreversibility: nonetheless - 
and paradoxically - as wittingly remembered in Hirsch 2012, the power of forgiveness stems from 
its unpredictability, and unpredictability is precisely that which promising is meant to prevent.  
One possible trajectory to follow - if we want to “embrace” this diquieting paradox -is the one 
offered by John Dewey, one of the founders of American pragmatist tradition: he used to say that 
etymology and study of everyday language - even though not sufficient in order to solve analytical 
problems - can provide some interesting insight about the notions we use, and can make us aware of 
how language constraints our thinking or  how dichotomies/logical semantic articulation can beco-
me incorporated in our analysis (Dewey 1939, pp. 5-6).  
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Now, if we carry out an etymologically exploration of responsibility, not only we find out that it 
comes from Latin respondere (“respond, answer to, promise in return”), which is composed by re- 
(“back”) and spondere (“to bind oneself, promise solemnly, to pledge”), and eventually trace back 
to an hypothetical Proto-Indo-European root *spend- (“to make an offering, perform a rite”). An 
additional etymological link with spondee - coming from Latin spondeus, and before from Greek 
spondeios (pous) - connects the notion of responsibility with the name of the meter originally used 
in chants accompanying libations, from sponde (“solemn libation, a drink-offering”), and is related 
to spendein “make a drink offering”, eventually tracing back to the same Proto-Indo-European root 
*spend-. It is revealing that the past participle of spondere (sponsus/sponsa), means “bridegroom/
bride”, or more literally “betrothed”: this means that, like promising (and like marriage…), respon-
sibility is a challenge that continuously renews itself, and cannot be easily discharged (and “com-
plied with”) once and for all.
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